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HOW LAW FIRMS CAN DO GOOD WHILE DOING 
WELL (AND THE ANSWER IS NOT PRO BONO)1
Russell Pearce* 
 
I was speaking with a transactional lawyer whom I hadn’t seen in many 
years.  He spoke with passion about his work.  He was making good 
money.  He was working on important deals.  He took pride that when he 
worked on a deal, all the parties understood what the deal was about, and 
the deals were basically fair.  Then he started to apologize.  He started to 
apologize for not doing good in his career as a lawyer.  In law school, he 
had done some public interest work, and he never followed up on it; then, 
as a lawyer, he didn’t do a lot of pro bono. 
So why did this lawyer feel the need to apologize?  His work was 
important, and he did it in an honorable way, but he subscribed to a basic 
tenet of professionalism, the business/profession dichotomy.2  Business 
people work primarily for self-interest.  Professionals—lawyers—work 
primarily for the public good.3
 
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham 
University School of Law. 
  Applied to the legal profession, that divides 
 1. For an outstanding examination of this topic with regard to the work of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in mass tort cases, see Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 2087 (2004). 
 2. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding 
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1229, 1238-42 (1995) [hereinafter Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm].  For a more 
extensive discussion of the dichotomy’s foundation in professionalism rhetoric, see Russell 
G. Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet: What Lawyers Can Learn From Rock and 
Roll, 14 WIDENER L.J. 907, at nn. 4-18 and accompanying text (2005) [hereinafter Pearce et 
al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet]. 
 3. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1239.  In Roscoe Pound’s 
classic formulation, a profession describes: 
a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public 
service—no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of 
livelihood.  Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the primary 
purpose.  Gaining a livelihood is incidental, whereas in a business or trade it is the 
entire purpose. 
ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).  See AMERICAN 
BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “ . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE”: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986) (noting that “the 
spirit of Dean Pound’s definition withstands the test of time”). 
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us into saints and sinners.4
It was not always this way.  When Louis Brandeis wrote about the 
lawyer’s role, he was a business lawyer who was both a fan and a critic of 
other business lawyers.
  If, like my acquaintance, you chose your path 
in the law because you wanted to make a lot of money, you are like a 
business person and thus a sinner.  If you decided to be a public-interest 
lawyer, then you are a saint. 
5  In matters of public concern, he viewed what we 
would today call the large-firm lawyer as “the people’s lawyer,” charged 
with leadership and identifying and promoting the public good. 6  In 
representing her clients, the work of the business lawyer was noble; she 
required the skills and moral judgment of a statesman.7  In the early 1960s, 
Erwin Smigel found that this view continued to dominate the way large 
firm lawyers understood their role.  His extensive interviews of large firm 
lawyers in New York revealed that they viewed themselves first and 
foremost as guardians of the law.8
This all changed later in the 1960s.  After that time, studies of large firm 
lawyers found that they had discarded the governing class ideal for the 
hired gun approach that had previously been a minority view.
 
9  Murray 
Schwartz and David Luban have identified the two key elements of the 
ideology that is dominant today: (1) extreme partisanship for your client 
and (2) moral non-accountability, meaning that as long as you are an 
extreme partisan, you have no moral obligations other than to pursue your 
client’s ends.10
Why this change?  The conventional wisdom is that large law firm 
 
 
 4. See Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal 
Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127, 130 (2004) 
[hereinafter Pearce & Uelman, Religious Lawyering] (drawing upon the distinctions made 
by Joseph Allegretti in his book, JOSEPH ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER’S CALLING: CHRISTIAN 
FAITH AND LEGAL PRACTICE (1996)). 
 5. LOUIS BRANDEIS, BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 331-33, 335 (Hale, Cushman & Flint 
1993) (1996).  See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The 
Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 401-02 (2001) (citing Brandeis’s comments on lawyers) 
[hereinafter Pearce, Governing Class]. 
 6. See Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 401.  Brandeis saw the role of the 
“people’s lawyer” to weigh fairly the interests of the individual clients and the common 
good.  See BRANDEIS, supra note 5, at 337. 
 7. See Brandeis, supra note 5, at 335. 
 8. See ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION 
MAN? (1964); see also Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 381, 405-07. 
 9. See id. at 407-10. 
 10. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 
CAL. L. REV. 669, 671-73 (1978); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL 
STUDY 10 (1988). 
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lawyers have gotten greedy since the 1960s.11  No matter how often this 
mantra is repeated, it is not persuasive.  Let’s face it: from the creation of 
what we know as the corporate law firm in the late 19th century, making 
money has been its raison d’etre—making money for big-business clients 
and for their lawyers.12
So what really happened?  Society shifted in the 1960s.  Most of the 
American elite, including lawyers, embraced the idea that people were 
fundamentally self-interested and not concerned with the public good.
 
13  If 
this were true, the only role that made sense for lawyers was that of an 
amoral hired gun.14
Two changes in the profession facilitated this shift.  The first was the 
creation of public-interest law as an area of practice in the 1960s.
 
15  The 
concept, as well as the label, of “public interest” law helped shift 
responsibility for the public good away from large firm lawyers to this 
small segment of the bar.16  The second was the new ethical duty of pro 
bono.17  Helping the poor had always been one of the general obligations of 
lawyers as the governing class, but the notion of a separate and distinct 
ethical duty dates only to the 1960s.18  Pro bono completed what public-
interest law began.  Within the practice of the large firm lawyer, it helped 
move the public good from the center to the margins of the large firm 
lawyer’s work.19  Today, business lawyers like my friend are operating 
with two contradictory ideologies: the hired gun conception which requires 
lawyers to serve as amoral advocates;20
 
 11. For an elaboration of this and other rationales for the collapse of professionalism, 
see Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 
 and a professionalism model which 
5, at 411-12. 
 12. See id. at n.307 and accompanying text. 
 13. See id. at 415-17; Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at nn. 
22-24 and accompanying text. 
 14. See Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra note 4, at 148-49. 
 15. See Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 417-19.  Although a few self-
conscious public interest law firms, such as the NAACP and the ACLU, existed long earlier, 
the establishment of a public interest bar of significant size dates from the 1960s.  Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. at 419-20. 
 18. See id. at 419-20; see also Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 6-20 (2004); Erichson, supra note 1, at 2108-11, 2115-16; Judith L. Maute, 
Changing Conceptions of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse 
Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91 (2002); Note, The New Public Interest 
Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970); Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 
2, at 912 n.28. 
 19. Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 420 (“[P]ro bono permitted lawyers to 
compartmentalize their public service obligations and avoid the governing class tension of 
mediating between client interests and the public good.”). 
 20. See note 10 supra. 
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condemns lawyers for failing to pursue the public good.21
How have lawyers responded?  Large numbers of lawyers believe they 
are self-interested and all about money.
 
22  Large numbers of lawyers also 
feel very bad about themselves.  It is no surprise that the rates of substance 
abuse and anxiety-related mental illness are far higher for lawyers than for 
other occupations,23 or that according to most surveys job satisfaction is far 
lower.24
How did the organized bar respond?  In 1984, Chief Justice Burger 
declared that law had become a business and that professionalism was in 
crisis.
 
25  In response, the bar declared war: a war of professionalism 
rhetoric, professionalism commissions, professionalism codes, mandatory 
ethics and professionalism continuing legal education courses, and pro 
bono, pro bono, pro bono.26
What is the result of the bar’s twenty-year professionalism campaign?  
Not much.
 
27  Why?  If most lawyers think they are in law to make money, 
you just can’t convince them that they are really working for the public 
good.28  If you make that argument, they are going to think you are either a 
hypocrite, a cynic, or a fool.29
 
 21. See Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra note 
 
4, at 146-47. 
 22. See, e.g., Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1251. 
 23. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 87 (1994); G. Andrew 
Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among 
United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 240 (1990); Lawrence S. Krieger, 
What We’re Not Telling Law Students—and Lawyers—That They Really Need to Know, 13 
J. L. & HEALTH 1, 3-4 (1998-99); Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra note 4, at 
149-50; Patrick Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, 
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 874-76 (1999). 
 24. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 85; Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra 
note 4, at 149; Schiltz, supra note 23, at 881-92.  But see, e.g., John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers 
and Their Discontents: Findings from a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 IND. L.J. 735, 736 
(1999).  For more extensive discussion of the complexity of measuring job satisfaction, see 
Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at 914 n.37; Schiltz, supra note 23, 
at 884-89. 
 25. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 63 (1984). 
 26. Pearce & Uelmen, Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at 912 n.31; Deborah 
L. Rhode, Law, Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543, 1556 
(2002). 
 27. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on 
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (1997); 
Eugene R. Gaetke, Renewed Introspection and the Legal Profession, 87 KY. L.J. 903, 909–
10 (1999); Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra note 2, at 148-49; Rhode, Law, 
Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, supra note 26, at 1556. 
 28. See, e.g., Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1251. 
 29. Id. at 1266.  Tom Shaffer has noted the irony of bar leaders’ claims that “lawyers 
who are ‘paid well . . . from the profits of commercialism act in the spirit of public service,’ 
but that business people ‘who practice commercialism do not.’”  Id. at 1260 (quoting 
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As for pro bono, like other forms of charity, it is a good deed.  But 
unless you place it within the context of broad moral obligation, it serves to 
relegate the public good to the margins of legal practice.30
First, adopt a realistic conception of commitment to the public good.
  What might 
make a difference?  Instead of trying to separate making money and doing 
well, we should try to integrate the two.  How would you go about that? 
31  
Most of us are neither saints nor sinners.  We are not morally superior by 
virtue of being lawyers.  We are just like everyone else.  We want to make 
money and we want to do good.32  That means, just like everyone else, we 
are morally accountable for what we do.33
Applying this idea to practice does not require automatically taking sides 
between, say, Monroe Freedman, Larry Fox, or Abbe Smith’s strong 
version of advocacy
 
34 and David Luban, Deborah Rhode or Bill Simon’s 
more circumscribed conception.35  But what it does mean is that all of us, 
whatever our views, have to justify our approach morally rather than 
simply assuming it as the bar too often does today.36
Second, moral responsibility does add one specific obligation: we must 
counsel our clients on the moral implications of their actions.
 
37
 
Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 403 
(1990-91)). 
  In doing 
so, we could teach clients moral accountability to the law and to society.  
Today’s lawyers, in contrast, too often promote or reinforce the 
instrumental attitude of the Enrons and the AIGs, grounded exclusively in 
 30. Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 420. 
 31. Pearce et al., Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1270-71, 1274-75; Russell 
G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and the Law-As-
Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 9, 19-23 (1999). 
 32. See, e.g., Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at nn.63-67 and 
accompanying text. 
 33. Id. at n.63 and accompanying text; Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, 
at 1268-76; Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers are Morally Accountable, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1805 (2002) (hereinafter Pearce, Model Rule 1.0). 
 34. See MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER’S ETHICS (3d ed. 
2004); Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout From Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided Notions of 
Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1243 (2003). 
 35. See generally LUBAN, supra note 10; DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000) [hereinafter IN THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE]; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
(1998). 
 36. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0, supra note 33, at 1806-07; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 
34, at 60; RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 8, 11, 38, 65. 
 37. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 66-67; Pearce, Model Rule 
1.0, supra note 33. 
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material self-interest.38  This proposal does not require a change in the 
rules.  Rule 2.1 already permits moral counseling.39  Nonetheless, most 
lawyers believe their role requires they take the amoral approach and 
ignore the permission to provide moral counsel.40
To change lawyer conduct, we need a clear statement from the courts 
and the bar that the lawyer’s role properly understood requires lawyers to 
be morally accountable.  A simple way to accomplish this objective is to 
promulgate a new, aspirational Model Rule providing that lawyers are 
morally accountable.
 
41
A new Model Rule restoring moral accountability to lawyers will 
certainly not resolve all the problems of the legal profession.  It is only a 
first step.  Yet if we discard the business-profession dichotomy and 
embrace moral accountability, it will make a big difference for the 
transactional lawyer whom I mentioned at the beginning of my talk.
  Until the American Bar Association adopts this 
new Model Rule, the large law firms have a wonderful opportunity for 
leadership.  They can serve as a model for the rest of the legal profession 
by pledging publicly to accept moral accountability and to provide moral 
counseling to their clients.  The large firms can also serve as the political 
force within the bar to promote the new rule of moral accountability. 
42
 
  We 
will then recognize that business lawyers like him are the exemplars of 
doing good while doing well.  Even more important, maybe he will 
recognize it too. 
 
 38. See Nancy B. Rappaport, Enron, Titanic and The Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1373 (2003); William H. Simon, “From the Trenches and Towers”: The Kaye Scholer 
Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 
23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998); Eli Wald, Lawyers and Corporate Scandals, 7 LEGAL 
ETHICS 54 (2004). 
 39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 2.1 (2002) (“In representing a client, a lawyer 
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering 
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, 
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”). 
 40. See notes 36 and 38 supra. 
 41. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0, supra note 33. 
 42. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1267-76; Pearce et al., 
Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at 146-52. 
